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1. The resurgence of Gentile studies in Italy and elsewhere 
It has been some twenty years since Gabriele Turi called time on the old 
‘Gentile problem’ - the problem, that is, of how to engage with Giovanni 
Gentile, a philosopher for so long ‘frozen’ in position, at least in the popular 
imagination, as ‘the philosopher of Fascism’. Turi made the case for ‘a return 
to a strictly philosophical Gentile’, without the ‘reductive’ assumptions and 
interpretive restrictions that had led previous generations of readers to think 
of him as a Fascist first and a philosopher only second.1 
Since then, Gentile’s reputation has gradually but unmistakeably 
thawed. Scholarly debate on his work is today in a healthier state than at any 
time since his death. The old Gentile problem has not been solved, but the air 
has now cleared sufficiently for commentators to have a serious debate about 
his ideas without having to take sides in the controversies over the rights and 
wrongs of the Mussolini regime. Gentile’s political career remains the focus 
of considerable academic interest, of course, but it now represents just one 
part of a larger debate about actualism and its author. For all that he remains, 
in Sergio Romano’s words, ‘an awkward philosopher’, he is widely 
recognised, alongside Benedetto Croce, as one of the premier Italian thinkers 
of the twentieth century, having made substantial contributions not only to 
political theory but also to aesthetics, ethics, theories of the self, pedagogical 
theory and, on a broader front, to Italian culture.
2
  
Gentile’s late restoration to the upper ranks of twentieth-century 
philosophers presents us, his twenty-first-century interpreters, with a new 
problem. What does actualism still have to offer? Or, supposing we can view 
                                                 
1
 G. Turi, Giovanni Gentile: Oblivion, Remembrance, and Criticism, trans. Lydia P. 
Cochrane, “Journal of Modern History”, 70 (4) 1998, pp. 913–33; pp. 915–16. 
2
 I take the phrase ‘awkward philosopher’ from the title of Sergio Romano’s paper, Un 
filosofo scomodo per tutti, in Stato etico e manganello. Giovanni Gentile a sessant’anni 
dalla morte, ed. Roberto Chiarini, Marsilio, Venice, 2004. 
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Gentile outside his peculiarly troubled historical context, what does he still 
have to say to us? My aim in what follows is to offer a survey of some of the 
major themes that have emerged in the recent literature on Gentile and the 
enduring value of his work. In doing so I will offer some reasons why his 
partial rehabilitation in Italy has not been met by a corresponding revival of 
interest among English-speaking philosophers. Finally, I will argue that for 
actualism to be subjected to the acid of analytic philosophy would constitute a 
valuable addition to the existing literature on Gentile and to Anglo-American 
philosophy more broadly. 
 
2. The ‘Gentile problem’ in the English-speaking world  
Gentile’s ideas have rarely been well received in the English-speaking world. 
While he had sympathetic readers in the 1920s and 1930s, interest in idealist 
thought was waning in Britain and America by the time he reached the peak 
of his fame in Italy. Soon after he became firmly established as the Fascists’ 
go-to philosopher, Gentile’s reputation was largely eclipsed by that of the 
Party. Even when he personally had little influence on policy, he and his ideas 
were cast in worse light each time the government changed its policies to 
align itself, little by little, with its belligerent ally in Germany.  
Even after the Second World War was over and Gentile was dead, the 
fact of his long, unapologetic adhesion to the Fascist regime was enough to 
keep many philosophers from engaging seriously with his ideas. Since 
Fascism was assumed to be an ideology ‘empty of ideas and honest 
motives… brutal, opportunistic and unintelligent’,3 intellectuals adhering to it 
could not possibly be anything but ‘liars, frauds and mountebanks’.4 Gentile 
was widely supposed to have surrendered his intellectual credibility when he 
came out in support of Mussolini; not only were his works published after 
that point to be viewed with suspicion, but so too were those already 
published, standing as exhibits of a career led disastrously astray by the 
promises of a misconceived Hegelianism.5 
                                                 
3
 G. Allardyce, What Fascism is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept, “The 
American Historical Review”, 84 (2), 1979, pp. 367–388; p. 368. 
4
 A. J. Gregor uses this phrase to characterise latter-day interpreters’ view of Fascist 
intellectuals. See Gregor’s ‘Introduction’ to G. Gentile, Origins and Doctrine of Society, 
with Selections from Other Works, Transaction, New Brunswick, New York, 2002, p. vii. 
5
 Among the scholars to dismiss Gentile’s philosophy as a selective reinterpretation of 
Hegel’s are H. Marcuse, in Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1955; and G. H. Sabine, A History of Political Thought, 
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Those few post-War English-speaking commentators who did take 
Gentile’s ideas seriously tended to present them explicitly in relation to 
debates over the intellectual substance of Fascism, often in order to counter 
the prevailing opinion that the Partito Nazionale Fascista was crudely anti-
intellectual. The works of A. James Gregor have been exemplary in this 
respect.6 Those who tried to engage with Gentile as a philosopher, as H. S. 
Harris did when he wrote his ‘essay in salvage’, The Social Philosophy of 
Giovanni Gentile, did little to attract the attention of their peers in philosophy 
departments, despite the undoubted value of their works for intellectual and 
political historians.
7
 Gentile ended up in the unenviable position of a 
philosopher frequently recognised as a major figure in the history of ideas, his 
theories better known from others’ exegeses than from being read in the 
original, and then almost never by philosophers prepared to do anything with 
them.  
The revival of Gentile studies in Italy during the 1990s had a minor 
parallel in the Anglophone world. This was due in part to the works of 
specialists in British idealism determined to measure the influence of the 
Italian idealists on R. G. Collingwood; 8  and to those interested in the 
                                                                                                                            
third edition, George G. Harrap, London, 1961. As late as 1997, Harry Redner set out with 
the express aim ‘to spare others, especially the young, all the painful effort [he] expended 
trying to profound sense of the temptingly fascinating works of [Gentile]’, in the reading of 
which he ‘wasted many of what should have been [his] best years’. See H. Redner, Malign 
Masters: Gentile, Heidegger, Lukács, Wittgenstein, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p. xi.   
6
 As well as his translation of Gentile’s Origini e dottrina del fascismo, cited above, A. J. 
Gregor’s major works on Gentile include The Ideology of Fascism, The Free Press, 
Toronto, 1969; Giovanni Gentile: Philosopher of Fascism, Transaction, London, 2002; and 
Mussolini’s Intellectuals: Fascist Social and Political Thought, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 2005. 
7
 For example, H. S. Harris, still the most widely acclaimed of the (very few) English-
speaking commentators on Gentile, wrote in the 1990s that ‘for more than thirty years I… 
lived with the conviction that my own book on Gentile [viz. The Social Philosophy of 
Giovanni Gentile, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1960] “fell dead-born from the 
press”.’ The book was thoroughly researched and judiciously presented, but Harris’s peers 
struggled to see the value in an examination of so thoroughly discredited a social 
philosopher as Gentile. See Harris, L’etica del sapere, “Clio” 27 (4), 1998, p. 615; and 
reviews of The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile by D. Germino, “The Journal of 
Politics”, 23 (3), 1961, pp. 584–587; and R. Gross, “Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science”, 336, pp. 222–223. 
8
 The relationship between Collingwood’s thought and Gentile’s is complicated, not least 
because the liberal Collingwood tried to downplay his debt to Gentile after the nature of 
Fascism became apparent. For more on this, see J. Connelly, Thou Art the Man: Croce, 
Gentile or de Ruggiero? in Philosophy, History and Civilization: Interdisciplinary 
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philosophy of history, themselves often attentive readers of Collingwood, 
Croce and de Ruggiero.9  But since the philosophy of history is typically 
practised in university history departments rather than philosophy 
departments, by historians rather than philosophers, actualism remained, and 
to a large extent still remains, closely bound to the historical Gentile and the 
controversies of his times. Few analytic philosophers read Gentile, or if they 
do, they let their opinions of him go unpublished. Today in the Anglophone 
world he is read largely for his connections to other philosophers, as an ally 
and later rival of Croce, an influence on Collingwood, and a dubious 
descendant of Hegel. 
 
3. Gentile’s political life and afterlife in Italy 
It should come as no surprise that the effects of the big thaw which Turi 
anticipated have been most marked in Italy.  There the story of the revival of 
Gentile studies is rather more complex.  
In his lifetime, Gentile had a substantial impact on Italian public life, 
first and most concretely through his educational reforms in the early 1920s, 
later through his articulation of a specific vision of the Italian state, which 
partly informed the official Party doctrine, and finally through his 
contributions to such institutions as the Enciclopedia Italiana. In his 
published works he developed the idea of an Italian intellectual tradition 
distinct from its French or German counterparts. In the twenty months he 
spent as Mussolini’s education minister, he exercised an extraordinary degree 
of freedom in reforming the Italian education system. It has been widely 
remarked that his autonomy in this role was due, in large part, to the fact that 
the Fascists had not yet worked out a policy programme, so they had no 
                                                                                                                            
Perspectives on R. G. Collingwood, ed. D. Boucher, J. Connelly and T. Modood, 
University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1995, pp. 92–114; J. Wakefield, Talking their Way Out 
of Relativism: Collingwood and Gentile on the Nature of Inquiry, “Collingwood and British 
Idealism Studies”, 19 (2), 2013, pp. 139–168; and J. Connelly, Collingwood, Gentile and 
Italian Neo-Idealism in Britain, in Thought Thinking: The Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile, 
ed. B. Haddock and J. Wakefield, Imprint Academic, Exeter, 2015, pp. 205–234. 
9
 Among the philosophy of history specialists interested in Gentile are Claudio Fogu, David 
D. Roberts and Rik Peters, all of whom have recognised the value and originality of 
Gentile’s ideas within their own sub-discipline. See e.g. C. Fogu, Actualism and the Fascist 
Historic Imaginary, “History and Theory”, 42 (2), 2003, pp. 196–221; and Fascism and 
Philosophy: the Case of Actualism, “South Central Review”, 23 (1), 2006, pp. 4–22; D. D. 
Roberts, Historicism and Fascism in Modern Italy, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 
2007; and R. Peters, History as Thought and Action: the Philosophies of Croce, Gentile, de 
Ruggiero and Collingwood, Imprint Academic, Exeter, 2013. 
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grounds on which to oppose him. Whatever accidents of circumstance gave 
him such free rein, Gentile’s brief ministerial career, before he was ‘kicked 
upstairs’ to a ceremonial position in the Ministry of Culture, made him a rare 
example of a bona fide philosopher king, with both political power and a clear 
idea of what he wanted to do with it.
10
 
All of this made Gentile’s posthumous reputation more precarious in 
his native country than elsewhere. He could not be treated as he was in 
Britain: largely ignored, occasionally ridiculed and from time to time trotted 
out as an example of one led astray by the sinister appeal of Fascist ideology. 
To Italian readers he represented something rather more substantial, having 
left a real mark on culture and, more tangibly still, on those who had read and 
absorbed his ideas before the War and sought to realise his principles of 
thought and action in new ways now that the old regime was gone. Italian 
commentators have long asked themselves whether the time has come for a 
fair and thorough reappraisal of Gentile’s work, distinguished by an 
appropriate air of ‘serenity’ in which scholars can take ‘the right interpretive 
attitude, free from prejudice’.11 The question of whether the right moment has 
yet arrived to make that assessment – a question which each author typically 
claims, at the moment of publishing his or her latest book, to be at last able to 
answer in the affirmative – has become, in a strange way, one of the most 
recurrent themes of the long post-War conversation about Gentile’s legacy. 
But in general, the deep controversy surrounding his name has led his 
interpreters to be extraordinarily careful when dealing with him. Much has 
been written about his place in the history of ideas, his relationships with 
other canonical thinkers (especially Croce), and his intellectual development. 
A central motif of the literature since the late 1990s has been the idea of 
Gentile as a ‘philosopher of the nation’ (filosofo della Nazione). He is 
pictured as a thinker of enduring relevance for Italy, having laid out a 
powerful theoretical case for the need for institutions to play an active role in 
defining all the elements of identity, including culture, language and history. 
                                                 
10
 I take the phrase ‘kicked upstairs’ from H. Redner, Malign Masters, p. 6. More detailed 
accounts of Gentile’s ministerial career can be found in M. Di Lalla’s Vita di Giovanni 
Gentile, Sansoni, Florence, 1975; and G. Turi, Giovanni Gentile. Una biografia, Giunti, 
Milan, 1995.  
11
 I take the word ‘serenity’ from A. Del Noce, Giovanni Gentile. Per una interpretazione 
filosofica della storia contemporanea, Il Mulino, Bologna 1990, p. 16. The other phrase 
comes from P. Pellegrino’s introduction to A. Signorini, Giovanni Gentile e la filosofia, Le 
Lettere, Florence, 2007, p. xiv. 
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His greatest contribution, on this view, was ‘to give national form to a 
universal culture’.12 This theory is not to be regarded as a relic of Fascist 
ideology. Quite the contrary, the theory is to be considered largely 
independent of the Party programme in which it featured. 13  Gentile is 
considered the inheritor of an intellectual tradition traceable to nineteenth-
century authors like Mazzini, D’Azeglio, Gioberti and Spaventa, who all, in 
their different ways, contributed to the vision of Italy as a spiritual construct 
which cannot be relied upon to come about spontaneously, but which must be 
endlessly made and remade, deliberately and actively instilled, in the public 
consciousness. 
Daniela Coli’s work may be taken as exemplary in this field. She has 
identified Gentile as a key figure in the foundation of ‘a national cultural 
tradition’, which crucially ‘survived the fall of Fascism’.14 She argues that he 
recognised the decadence and fragility of certain historical currents in Italian 
culture and was preoccupied with ‘the figure of the scholar who had no sense 
of civic life and who… was symbolic of a civilization that was cultured, 
refined, rich and frivolous, but had no sense of national sovereignty, was 
incapable of defending its territory against foreign invasion, and was willing 
to let itself be governed by foreigners’. Gentile, by contrast, was a fierce 
advocate of Italian cultural sovereignty and the political institutions that 
helped sustain it; he was engaged in the life of the nation through and 
through. He believed that his educational reforms would bring about nothing 
less than a transformation of the national consciousness.15 The idea of Italy, or 
of any nation, is realised to the extent that actual, thinking people identify 
with it and regard its interests as their own. Only thus can political or cultural 
norms have any moral authority. Italian identity is not a given, but something 
constructed, something fragile and impermanent. Its construction must be 
effected self-consciously if its result is to be more than pensiero pensato, an 
abstraction without value. 
                                                 
12
 I take this phrase from the title of a short paper by Vincenzo Zaccheo: Dare forma 
nazionale ad una cultura universale, in Giovanni Gentile, il filosofo della Nazione, 
Pantheon, Rome, 2006, pp. 25–28. 
13
 They may be considered ‘largely independent’ thanks to the appearance of many of the 
ideas in works like Gentile’s Fondamenti della filosofia del diritto, published in 1916. 
14
 D. Coli, Giovanni Gentile. La filosofia come educazione nazionale, Mulino, Bologna, 
2004, p. 144. 
15
 D. Coli, Gentile and Modernity, in Thought Thinking, pp. 137–166; pp. 165–166. 
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Alessandro Amato has provided a more painstakingly theoretical, rather 
than historical, foundation for this way of reading Gentile’s work. The 
philosopher was not, argues Amato, a willing dupe or uncritical acolyte of 
Mussolini, as some critics have supposed, but an independent, conscientious 
and strikingly original thinker, who supplied a voice of reason and conscience 
from within the Party, just as his opponents, like Benedetto Croce, did from 
without.16 Present in all Gentile’s works is the idea that constant reflection 
and self-criticism is necessary if any kind of institution, be it a principle or a 
political party, is to have real moral substance. Another recurrent theme is the 
need to realise thought in action: virtue consists not only of thinking about 
right and wrong, but also of working to correct the wrongs one identifies. On 
these grounds, Amato plausibly contends that Gentile, qua philosopher, had 
an ambivalent relationship to the Party of which he was a member. Actualism 
was in a sense the philosophy, or at least a philosophy, of Fascism, but also, 
with its insistent stress on the need for self-criticism and authenticity, of anti-
Fascism. So conceived, as a contingently partisan doctrine, actualism may 
well have something to say to us, irrespective of our political allegiances in 
the present day. 
Perhaps the greatest achievement of the commentators just cited is to 
have rehabilitated Gentile’s philosophy, especially his political philosophy, 
without fudging the hard problems that arise from his biography and the 
institutions in and under which he worked. The historical figure remains 
always in view, but does not obscure what is worth remembering from his 
work. There remains an open question of how convincingly the historical 
Gentile realised his ideals in practice, and even of whether actualism provides 
a sufficient foundation for any substantive principles – we might think, for 
example, of his quietist response to the Racial Laws (Leggi razziali) of 
1938.17 Yet his ideas are intelligible even outside the context in which he 
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 A. Amato, L’etica oltre lo stato. Filosofia e politica in Giovanni Gentile, Mimesis, 
Milan, 2011, passim, but especially p. 15; see also G. Capozzi, Giovanni Gentile. Il filosofo 
oltre l’uomo, Satura, Naples, 2004, p. 129–130. 
17
 These are questions with which historians continue to engage. For examples from the 
recent literature, see Alessandra Tarquini, Il Gentile dei fascisti. Gentiliani e antigentiliani 
nel regime fascista, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2009; Luciano Mecacci, La Ghirlanda fiorentina e 
la morte di Giovanni Gentile, Adelphi, Milan, 2014; Alessandra Cavaterra, La rivoluzione 
culturale di Giovanni Gentile: la nascita della Enciclopedia italiana, Cantagalli, Siena, 
2014; and Rosella Faraone, Giovanni Gentile, ‘The Philosopher of Fascism’: Cultural 
Leadership in Fascist and Anti-Semitic Italy, Lewistown, New York, Edwin Mellen Press, 
2017. 
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worked. Whether or not he succeeded in squaring his actions with his ideas, 
his philosophy can be judged on its own terms. Fascism gave him a platform, 
a vehicle, for his ideas, and it was within the complex of Fascist ideology that 
he expressed them. Nonetheless, he recognised that institutions are 
perpetually in fieri, changing according to the contingent needs, interests and 
purposes that actual thinking imposes on them. Since many of the political 
institutions to which he referred no longer exist, or have substantially changed 
in the seventy years since his death, part of his theory may be set aside as an 
historical artefact, a piece of pensiero pensato, applicable to his historical 
context but not to ours. The rest, revived in the very different context of Italy 
today, has acquired a new significance, perhaps different from any that 
Gentile himself could ever have imagined. We can accept his adhesion to the 
Party as a fact about him without having to view the whole of his philosophy, 
nor even of his political philosophy, in that light. The philosopher, to borrow 
Gino Capozzi’s apt metaphor, has a life beyond that of the man, the historical 
figure.18  
What is striking about this way of reading Gentile is that it demands 
very little of actualism. Gentile can be redeemed as a ‘great man’, a major 
figure in Italian cultural history and as an advocate for national self-
consciousness whether or not his detailed theories hold water. Even Amato’s 
subtle and generous interpretation of Gentile’s moral and political thought can 
be read for its conclusions without concern for the finely detailed reasoning 
that leads him to them. The main outcome of that interpretation is that Gentile 
was not just an uncritical ideologist who pushed his arguments where his 
employers needed them to go, but a serious and independent thinker who just 
happened to develop his ideas within the political apparatus available to him 
at the time. He, the historical Gentile, has thus become iconic of a certain cast 
of mind, a way of thinking about the relationship between individual and 
national identity, rather than any single political creed. 
Gentile’s partial rehabilitation as a ‘philosopher of the nation’ and a 
champion of Italian culture has shown that he has an enduring relevance 
independent of the contingencies of his own historical and political context. 
Yet it has also had the unhelpful side-effects of leading commentators to treat 
his whole system of ideas with too much reverence, as though it were a 
unified, irreducible object, and further of making the philosopher, rather than 
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 Cf. G. Capozzi, Giovanni Gentile, esp. pp. 110–131. 
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the discrete, fine-grained arguments through which his philosophy is 
expressed, the object of assessment. If we start to regard actualism as the 
masterwork of a ‘great man’ rather than just a philosopher, as an artefact of 
Italian literature rather than a set of arguments, our interpretive priorities 
change. Actualism, on this view, stands as a monument in the history of 
Italian ideas. The beauty of a cathedral, we might say, is not best appreciated 
by someone looking at it through a microscope. There is something to be said 
for viewing actualism in this way, but I think that there is scope for narrowly 
philosophical engagement, too. 
 
4. Universal implications of actualism 
Actualism is not only, nor even primarily, a political doctrine. It also includes 
a rich account of human experience, especially the social dimensions of 
thought and personal identity. The starting point for actualism is the 
observation that, for each thinker, there is and can be only one act of thinking, 
which plays out continuously in the eternal present of her consciousness. No 
thinker can escape the activity of her consciousness and see the world as it 
really or objectively is. As such, the standpoint of actual thinking is not just 
one point of view among others. For all that we often talk about the world as 
if we were all subjects sharing an objective really, strictly speaking, there can 
never be an objective plurality of consciousnesses, independent of that 
singular act of thinking, since all but one consciousness is a construction, a 
creation, of the one that conceives of them.19  
Gentile recognises that, given these assumptions, actualism might be 
considered an isolating, solipsistic doctrine, depriving the world, even life 
itself, of meaning and value. This, he believes, is a misinterpretation. To 
counter it, he introduces the image of the ‘internal society’, or società in 
interiore homine, suggesting that thinking is to be thought of as a dialogue we 
have with ourselves, not only in the familiar Socratic sense in which we ask 
and answer questions, but in the sense that our self-conceptions are informed 
                                                 
19
 This is well put by Alberto Signorini: ‘Gentile’s self cannot be thought of as a mere point 
of view among others. In reality there is but one point of view, which is that of thought in 
the act, which is always singular and is made plural only in its works, which are manifest 
through it as living spirit. We are not always thinking: our thought is not uninterrupted; 
…and yet when we are thinking, the only reality that exists is that of thought, because 
every possible objection to that reality occurs within the ambit of (our) thought. Nothing is 
outside the thought that thinks, and all attempts to disprove this thesis will come to 
nothing’.  See A. Signorini, Giovanni Gentile e la filosofia, p. 100. 
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by our interactions with other people. Despite the fact that we cannot be party 
to their subjective experiences, we make them part of our conscious reality as 
we think with and for them. Antonio G. Pesce has written movingly of the 
implications of this image: 
 
This society in and through which I live… guarantees the truthfulness of my existence. 
By holding fast to life’s deepest root, I do not lose myself, and if ever I do, actualism 
offers a way of returning to myself, of withdrawing inside myself to find the deepest 
sense of my existence. And this deep root will never snap… [C]an [we]… doubt those 
attachments that cradled us through our adolescent years... those caresses that 
comforted us in our most difficult moments growing up, or the happiness and sadness 
that have left their imprint on us and made us who we are? No, we cannot, because it 
is to that socius which is my mother, my father, my life-long friend or the person I 
love, that I return in moments of confusion, to find that solid ground, that rock on 
which I belong.
20
 
 
We human beings are inescapably social creatures, even in our private 
thoughts. Our social nature is manifest in how we think and feel about 
ourselves; it shapes our identities as individuals. We are able to think 
critically, to refine and correct our beliefs, thanks to our ability to picture 
ourselves at points of view other than the one we now actually occupy. 
Despite the fact that there can only be one actual site of consciousness, none 
of us lives and thinks in a private, subjective universe. As we think, we are 
always in the company of other selves, since we speak to ourselves in voices 
besides our own. And the fact that we belong to this ‘internal society’ (società 
interna) should inform our relations to other people, not only in our private 
reflections, but in the world of ordinary social interactions. To ‘secure the 
truthfulness of [our] existence’, to live in truth, to be authentic, we must 
recognise this essential part of ourselves and reject the abstraction of crude 
individualism, as well as the selfishness and isolation that result from it. Pesce 
elsewhere develops this view: 
 
As one grows up one comes to recognise that one is not alone in the world. Loneliness 
is but the failure of human existence, a cancer that saps the life of those who are sick, 
just as it does society as a whole. We would do well today to think about whether we 
cannot profit from this lesson… Think of the broken society made up of social, 
cultural and economic particularities; think of the solitude in which some people live, 
a solitude which eats away at them day after day, which pushes so many to suicide, to 
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 A. G. Pesce, The Integral Philosophical Experience of Actualism, in Thought Thinking, 
pp. 45–72; p. 68. 
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depression, to moral listlessness. Do we really think that actualism no longer has 
anything to teach us?
21
 
 
This interpretation of actualism differs subtly but significantly from 
those already discussed. Pesce reads it as a doctrine concerned with what we 
most fundamentally are and how this bears upon our relationships to each 
other. Gentile’s political theory can be fitted more or less exactly around these 
commitments, but really, at bottom, actualism is a moral and humanistic 
doctrine. The fact that the historical Gentile was a Fascist who presented 
much of his theory in explicitly Fascist terms is, on this view, precisely that 
and no more: a historical consideration, the result, perhaps, of poor decisions 
on his part, but in no way decisive as we read his philosophy in the twenty-
first century, when the political circumstances in which he lived and worked 
no longer obtain. His enduring message is one of solidarity, social 
responsibility and self-conscious commitment to other people. ‘It is striking’, 
writes Alberto Signorini, 
 
that Gentile’s life represents a close approximation of the spirit of his philosophy. His 
was a life of hard work, as well as painstaking consideration for other people, not only 
his friends –  evidence may be seen in the humanism of his endless letters, in his 
works and in his actions throughout his industrious existence.
22
 
 
The passages above show how Gentile and actualism can be kept 
simultaneously in view without either obscuring the other. Again the 
historical figure is somewhat redeemed by this interpretation. A careful and 
sensitive reading of his philosophy reveals something of his character and his 
attitude toward other people, prompting new questions about how he must 
have thought about his own position as the full ramifications of the Fascist 
project became clear.  
I nonetheless believe that there is more to be done with actualism and 
that the tools of analytic philosophy are the means by which to do it. To apply 
those methods, we will need to put Gentile out of the picture altogether. In the 
next section I will try to explain why this is so and what this procedure would 
involve. 
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 A. G. Pesce, L’interiorità intersoggettiva dell’attualismo. Il personalismo di Giovanni 
Gentile, Aracne, Roma 2012, p. 151. 
22
 A. Signorini, Giovanni Gentile e la filosofia, cit., p. 64. 
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5. Actualism and analytic philosophy 
Let us first be clear about what I mean when I say ‘analytic philosophy’. By 
this I mean the broad view of philosophy currently prevalent in, but by no 
means exclusive to, the English-speaking world. Shaped in debates over 
language in the twentieth century, analytic philosophy may be distinguished 
by its narrow focus on the forms and functions of arguments. The business of 
doing philosophy, on this view, is to be regarded as a problem-solving 
exercise. Related biographical, literary, historical and cultural issues, or 
themes of ‘meaning’, broadly construed, which feature prominently in much 
philosophy in the ‘continental’ tradition, are for the most part set aside by 
analytic philosophers unless they bear directly on arguments as written. 
It might be thought that analytic philosophy’s unrelenting focus on 
arguments makes it a poor tool with which to probe Gentile’s work. It is 
tempting to think of actualism (although I do not wholly agree with this view) 
as a collection of concepts, images and stirring phrases, all founded on the 
idea, described in seminal works like ‘L’atto del pensare come atto puro’, of 
the inescapable standpoint of pensiero pensante, the thinker in action.23 So 
conceived, it amounts to a general vision, impressively comprehensive in 
scope, of the world as each of us experiences it in the eternal here-and-now. 
As an incentive to adopt the peculiar standpoint that this vision demands, we 
are made a tantalising offer: a vindication of human agency and the boundless 
creative capacities of active, self-conscious thinking. For this vision alone 
Gentile would deserve his place on the pantheon of great Italian thinkers. 
Actualism represents a great and culturally significant body of literature, 
containing imaginative, provocative accounts of long-standing (I hesitate to 
say ‘permanent’) problems. The answers it provides are ingenious and 
stimulating irrespective of whether they, or the premises supporting them, are 
sound. 
I am not convinced that this way of thinking about Gentile and 
actualism does them justice. If he had offered us only imaginative, evocative 
but ultimately faulty treatments of various familiar philosophical problems, 
we could rightly relegate Gentile studies to the history department, or the 
department of cultural studies, rather than the philosophy department across 
the street. The history of philosophy is a narrower discipline than the history 
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 G. Gentile, L’atto del pensare come atto puro, in La riforma della dialettica hegeliana, 
Sansoni, Florence, 2003 [1913], pp. 183–195.  
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of ideas. It is not enough for philosophers to write evocatively or to impress 
us with their prolificacy, their erudition or their breadth of vision. Their job is 
not, first and foremost, to inspire us as mystics or poets do, and certainly not 
to furnish future intellectual historians with texts to ponder and set in the 
proper historical context. It is conceivable that someone should be an 
excellent philosopher without doing any of these things, or else that one 
should do them all and still be a poor philosopher. At bottom, it is their 
business to tell their readers something true, and more pointedly to 
disentangle the truth from the falsities, half-truths and nonsense in which the 
truth often comes to us, whether deliberately or mistakenly, entangled. If it 
can be shown that actualism contains insights that are not only ingenious and 
evocative but true, we will have reason to treat Gentile not only as a great 
Italian thinker, but as a major philosopher in his own right. 
This is where analytic philosophy can do its work. Since I know of no 
comparable analytic treatment of actualism, let me refer to my own example. 
I examine the arguments of actualism, with specific interest in its implications 
for moral theory, in my book Giovanni Gentile and the State of 
Contemporary Constructivism.24 The writing of this book was prompted by 
some of the observations I have described above. Gentile seemed to me both 
a remarkable figure in the history of philosophy and a better philosopher than 
his English-speaking critics usually acknowledged. It struck me, too, that 
certain major themes in his work – in particular the intrinsically moral status 
of self-conscious thought, the possibility of truth in the context of subjective 
fallibility, and the role of thinking in the creation or construction of reality – 
overlapped suggestively with some of those prominent in today’s analytic 
philosophy. Given my special interest in meta-ethics, and since none of 
Gentile’s systematic works is straightforwardly concerned with moral 
questions, I sought to determine what an actualist moral theory might look 
like. 
Remarks on moral matters can be found scattered throughout Gentile’s 
works, but his most substantial and detailed accounts are to found in works on 
law, religion and politics.25 Further generous hints are contained in works on 
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education and even logic.26 My aim was to subject actualism to the acid of 
analysis, treating it simply as philosophy, and to discuss it in the same register 
we use to talk about the works of Kant or Wittgenstein, in order to determine 
whether its recurrent motif of the creation or construction of reality might 
have something new, or at least hitherto unappreciated, to tell us (that is, anti-
realists in contemporary moral philosophy) about how we can make sense of 
moral commitments without either taking them for granted or making them 
too flimsy to have any practical hold on us. 
Since Gentile’s treatments of moral themes are widely spread, various 
motivated and often spliced into discussions of other philosophers’ ideas, it 
was necessary to employ certain contrivances. I began by explicitly setting 
aside the biographical and political controversies of Gentile’s life. I sought to 
develop a broadly ahistorical account of actualism by divorcing my 
examination of its workings from its author’s ‘personality, motives, and 
allegiances’ in order that I could realise my aim of presenting it as ‘a series of 
arguments’. Thus I sought to present a ‘rational re-construction of [Gentile’s] 
ideas, assembling a composite doctrine from those that are persuasive and 
rejecting those that are faulty. By operating at this carefully maintained level 
of abstraction’, I intended ‘to keep the discussion firmly within the realm of 
moral philosophy and divorced as cleanly as possible from the soul-searching 
intellectual biographies that [had] dominated the literature elsewhere’.27  
Now, it may be objected that that is something amiss about viewing 
actualism in this way, as though it were supposed to be, or at least to contain, 
a theory by which to solve moral problems. Gentile, our imaginary objector 
might say, was simply not that kind of philosopher. His chief concern was 
with the system, the full scope of what can be seen from the rigorously 
defined standpoint of actualism, not with the rather mundane question of how 
the thinker, whatever her situation might be, should make up her mind about 
what to do. To expect actualism to yield such a theory is to misunderstand 
Gentile’s intentions and, by extension, the kind of philosopher he was. The 
fact that he does not spell out a moral theory should tell us that he did not 
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think this kind of inquiry could proceed, like Kant’s, from first principles. He 
thinks instead that, to solve moral problems, or even to make them 
intelligible, we must first set ourselves self-consciously at the standpoint of 
actualism. From there the solutions will appear obvious, but the role of the 
philosopher, as Gentile sees it, is to show us how to attain that standpoint, not 
to describe to us in advance what we will see when we get there. 
In this light it is easy to see why analytic philosophers have been so 
reluctant to engage with Gentile. He employs a host of concepts fitted to 
problems he has set himself and makes little effort to explain himself or to 
provide a firm basis for predictions and judgements in other domains. He is 
little concerned about easing readers into the standpoint of actualism, 
gradually tracing a path from conventional wisdom through to the 
counterintuitive but, in his view, incontrovertible conclusions he supports. 
Rather, he defines his position rapidly, in broad, bold strokes, before 
describing to the reader what view his standpoint offers of each in a sequence 
of related philosophical questions. The reader is left to supply the fine details 
(and sometimes not only those) of the arguments which convey Gentile from 
one step to the next, and to guess at his reasons for choosing one line of travel 
rather than another. For this reason, his arguments, even when painstakingly 
reconstructed, never seem finished, but always open to further development if 
only some appropriate vantage point can be found. The connections he draws 
between ethics, religion, education and politics are rich with insight and often 
beyond the scope of philosophy that occurs within more conventionally 
circumscribed categories. Yet this also why our analysis of Gentile’s view of 
one conceptual issue, however exhaustive it might appear, can never be 
confidently concluded.
28
 Context is king; no actualist argument, such as it is, 
can be considered correctly formulated unless the vast edifice of actualism, 
the entire system, is erected around it.  
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For all that Gentile is at times wilfully obscure and frustratingly self-
referential, and for all that he would most likely reject the conception of 
philosophy that underlay my treatment of him – that is, as a technical 
discipline concerned with problem-solving, in practice as far removed from 
culture and even its history as painting is from art criticism – his work is in 
one respect peculiarly well suited to this kind of analysis. This is because, in 
contrast to so many system-building idealists, he goes to great pains to 
connect each extension of his doctrine to a single, basic conception of 
thinking and the necessity of absolute immanence. There is some truth to 
Guido de Ruggiero’s complaint that Gentile tended to reduce all problems to 
one, namely, that of distinguishing unreal abstractions from the concrete 
reality our thinking perpetually generates.
29
 Yet it does provide his 
interpreters with a clearly defined starting point and a set of questions to 
answer as they set out. What does it mean to say that the self is an activity? 
What does this view imply for our theories of knowledge and action? What 
conceptual space, if any, does this view leave open for a conception of moral 
value?  
Each of these questions is answered, more or less directly, in Gentile’s 
works. However, his answers are often unclear. At times he takes tremendous 
things for granted. He notoriously equates the ‘transcendental society’ or ‘the 
society inside the person’ (la società in interiore homine) – the device, 
already mentioned, by which he distinguishes his theory from solipsism, 
introducing a second-person standpoint even within the confines of 
consciousness of the sole actual thinker – with ‘the state inside the person’ (lo 
Stato in interiore homine), then that with the empirical state and, in a further 
leap, the empirical state with the dictator at its head.30 In a few rapid steps, 
aided by little more than a play on words, Gentile concludes that the dictator 
has the moral authority to tell the individual thinker what she ‘really’ wants 
and thinks. This is precisely the kind of equivocation for which Gentile 
became so notorious in the Fascist period, leading his critics to believe that 
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his ethics amounted to no more than a demand for uncritical obedience to an 
arbitrary authority.  
I argued instead that while his equivocation of the two kinds of state is 
illegitimate, the theory can be saved. What it lacks is a plausible account of 
how the empirical state and the transcendental state are connected, and by 
extension how claims of political authority can be justified when each thinker 
is necessarily responsible for creating her own frame of reference. Such an 
account can be reconstructed, I argued, from Gentile’s various remarks on the 
nature of truth and judgement, as applied to the ‘internal dialogue’. Thus, by 
means of bootstrapping, actualist moral theory, or at least a version of it, can 
be redeemed.31 
There is another possible objection to be faced. This is the objection 
that, by separating actualism from its author and volunteering an ahistorical 
and, crucially, revisionist account of a part of the doctrine that, as I 
acknowledged at the outset, Gentile leaves undeveloped, the best I could have 
hoped to develop was a moral theory that looked somewhat like his but was, 
in fact, a new, speculative creation. Critics with contrasting opinions of the 
merits of actualism might reasonably worry either that I am linking Gentile 
with my theory in order to profit from his newly revived reputation, or else 
that by doing this I am failing to take seriously the close tie between 
actualism and political authoritarianism. My selective reconstruction of 
Gentile has made him little more than a Kantian liberal, while the moral grit 
and gristle of his life, the facts that make him such a remarkable figure in 
history and philosophy alike, go unacknowledged.  
I appreciate the force of this objection, although I cannot accept the 
implication that a revisionist interpretation of actualism is illegitimate. 
Fundamental to my own reading of actualism, and necessary, I would 
suggest, to anyone who seeks to treat it simply as philosophy, is the thought 
that the historical Gentile was effectively the first reader of his own 
philosophy. His life was complicated by any standard. He found himself 
facing choices that would be hard for anyone, even without his rock-bottom 
belief in the moral significance of integrity and autonomy. There is an 
argument to be had – an argument which began in the 1920s and shows no 
signs of concluding – about how he should have responded to those choices 
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and how far he was complicit in their consequences. But for all that he 
willingly bound his theory to the institutions of his day, the theory is 
separable from the context. It can mean something for us, here and now, long 
after Gentile’s death, even if it did not and cannot have that meaning for him. 
And it is worth trying to find out what that meaning is, even if the results are 
not all we might want them to be. 
My final observation for this section is that while I know of no other 
strictly analytic treatments of actualism, it would be a mistake to imagine that 
further such treatments of other parts of the doctrine would have to be 
constructed from the ground up. Analytic philosophy is sometimes talked 
about as though it were something different in kind from ‘continental’ 
philosophy of the type most commonly practised in Italy, but in truth the 
differences are in stress and approach rather than substance. My own 
examination of actualism owes much to the richness of the Italian literature 
that preceded it, including several of the sources I have mentioned here. 
Continental philosophers routinely employ cold-blooded analysis to 
determine whether arguments make sense, just as analytic philosophers 
sometimes refer to history, biography and all the rest to help orient their 
interpretations. These traditions give us a choice of perspectives, perhaps 
mutually beneficial, from which to view the same material. 
 
6. The case for an ahistorical Gentile 
Actualism and its author have for a long time been treated as a complete 
package. Gentile has come down to us laden with a considerable burden of 
prior judgements, some of his own making, others applied later by his 
interpreters. Actualism, if I may be permitted another metaphor, might seem 
to come with strings attached, as the idiom goes; with the expectation that, by 
taking actualism seriously, we are somehow taking sides in the long-standing 
controversies over Gentile’s reputation. But the recent revival of Gentile 
studies has shown us, I think, that with our great luxury of hindsight, we can 
see how philosophy, and even philosophers themselves, might come to mean 
something, even to stand for something, that in their own time they did not. 
To see what that something might be, we need to treat philosophy simply as 
philosophy, to indulge in the old business of taking ideas apart, seeing how 
they work, fixing any faults and putting them back together again. There is 
nothing unusual about any of this. It is what philosophy has been about since 
the beginning. 
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The enduring strength of actualism, it seems to me, resides in the fact 
that it has at its heart a set of simple but suggestive claims. Our experience of 
the world, and indeed of ourselves, is mediated through the act of thinking; 
thought is something that we do, not something that happens to us; it 
therefore falls to us to think as well as we can, without illusion, complacency 
or false consciousness, and to do what we can in the present to make the as-
yet-unrealised future the best it can be. This view of actualism enables and 
emboldens us to distinguish between what is and is not essential to it; to 
distinguish Gentile-as-philosopher from Gentile-as-historical-figure, while 
recognising the independence of the latter as a legitimate object of study and 
the first reader, so to speak, of the former; and to salvage from an endlessly 
complicated period of Italian history a body of ideas that need not be bound to 
them. There is more to philosophy than what Gentile saw or found 
interesting. If we can make actualism live and speak for itself, I daresay we 
will find that it has something worthwhile to tell us. 
There can be scarcely any greater compliment to a philosopher, any 
clearer indication of how far his rehabilitation has come, for us to address his 
arguments, to criticise and amend them, as though he were alive here and now 
– to treat his ideas, in Croce’s phrase, as something living rather than dead.32 
Perhaps this will seem perverse to some readers, understandably chary of the 
idea of turning to such a notorious figure, or at least a figure with such 
notorious connections, for new insight, or else of corrupting the legacy of a 
historically or culturally important thinker, by reinterpreting and revising his 
ideas in ways over which he can have no say. But to treat Gentile in this way 
will not harm the existing scholarship; quite the contrary, it will reveal both 
flaws and strengths that even he may not have recognised. There can be no 
surer vindication of the independence of thought than to think with even those 
with whom we disagree. That, I suspect, might rather have pleased him.  
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